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Abstract
The question asked in this paper is whether modern societies enable the individual to lead
a happier life. It was hoped during the Age of the Enlightenment that rationally designed
social conditions would lead in the future to greater prosperity, more security and increa-
sed happiness for all. Only a little of this optimism has survived into the twentieth centu-
ry. In their studies on anomie, sociologists such as Durkheim, Merton and Sennett have
drawn attention to the darker sides of progress. Current theories of anomie – explicit
social critiques – entirely ignore the successes of modernity and discuss only its crises. In
these theories, anomie is described as a structural feature of modern societies, whose
destructive consequences are manifested by growing alienation, increasing social isolati-
on and rising suicidality. Empirical analyses of data from Germany show, however, that
these theses diverge from the reality. Despite rapid processes of modernisation, anomic
patterns of perception and behaviour have not become more widespread over the last 20
years; on the contrary, in some areas anomie has decreased significantly. Proceeding
from this insight, this article proposes a correction of those models of anomie that are
blind to progress. The crises of modernity are confronted with its successes, which have
helped considerably to reduce anomic reactions and to stabilise subjective well-being at a
high level. Finally, the article points out that this is not a stable equilibrium, rather that
temporal and structural imbalances may occur in the course of modernisation processes,
whose magnitudes may, however, be curbed – albeit not entirely or in every respect.
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I The dark side of progress: anomie in modern society
“But, in fact, is it true that the happiness of the individual
increases as man advances? Nothing is more doubtful.”
 Émile Durkheim (1960 [1893], p. 241)
The ambivalence of progress is one of the central topics of modernity. Writers, compos-
ers, painters and philosophers have repeatedly addressed the question as to whether
modern society enables the individual to lead a happier life. Doubts had arisen as early
as the mid-eighteenth century with respect to this mechanistic view of the world and to
the belief in progress characteristic of the Enlightenment. In 1754 Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau had published the first comprehensive critique of modern society, entitled De
l’inégalité parmi les hommes. Rousseau argued that individuals are forced by civilisa-
tion to live contrary to their nature; they are robbed of their freedom and become in-
creasingly socially dependent; they lose their cognitive capacity and their true character
is ruined. He claimed that “in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity and civilisa-
tion, and of such sublime codes of morality” life in modern society is nothing but “a
frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and
pleasure without happiness.” (Rousseau 1913 [1754] pp. 207-238).
Within sociology it was Émile Durkheim who provided the first important reflections
on the ambivalence of social progress. Durkheim’s view was that the increasing division
of labour had significant implications for social cohesion (Durkheim 1960 [1893]). On
the one hand, he claimed, functional differentiation leads to increasing social differen-
tiation. As a result, mechanical solidarity, that based on social similarity, weakens (ibid.
pp. 70-110). On the other hand, the division of labour engenders a new form of social
cohesion, an organic solidarity that is based on the heterogeneity of individuals (ibid.
pp. 111-132). “In effect [...] each one depends as much more strictly on society as labor
is more divided; and [...] the activity of each is as much more personal” (ibid. p. 131).
Durkheim saw no guarantee that the change from mechanical to organic solidarity
would prove successful. In fact he was afraid that the dynamic of economic develop-
ment, the struggle between capital and labour, and the increasing disunity of the sci-
ences would lead to an abnormal form of the division of labour that did not generate
new solidarity (ibid. pp. 353-409). Durkheim traced the threat to social cohesion back to
social crises that weaken the ties between the individual and society, and he termed this
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state of rulelessness “anomie”. The consequences of this breakdown in social integra-
tion, claimed Durkheim in his treatise Suicide – A Study in Sociology, are rootlessness,
social isolation, and a rising propensity to commit suicide (Durkheim 1963 [1897]).
Around the turn of the century there was widespread awareness of the darker sides of
modernisation. For Max Weber, ongoing rationalisation was tantamount, on the one
hand, to social progress. The acme of rationalisation was perceived by Weber in bu-
reaucratic organisation, a form of organisation superior to any other: “No machinery in
the world functions so precisely as this apparatus of men and, moreover, so cheaply ...”
(Weber 1968 [1921], p. 223). On the other hand, Weber warned against total subjuga-
tion under instrumental rationality. In a completely bureaucratised society, individuals
would find themselves imprisoned by rationality. “The great question is [...] what can
we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this par-
celing-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life”
(Weber 1958 [1946], p. 212).
Contemporaries of Weber expressed similar misgivings. Ferdinand Tönnies was con-
cerned that tradition, faith and the sense of community were being displaced by in-
creasing commercialisation and the spread of scientific methods (Tönnies 1991 [1887]).
Georg Simmel pointed to the social and psychological problems associated, in his view,
with the introduction of the modern monetary economy (Simmel 1994 [1900]).
In the mid-1960s the American sociologist Robert K. Merton propounded his concep-
tion of anomie, which differed in a number of important respects from Durkheim’s ap-
proach. Merton proceeded from a distinction between cultural structure and social
structure (Merton 1968). It is in the cultural structure of a society, he argued, that the
generally accepted views of the meaning of human life are anchored (ibid. pp. 186-193).
Merton considered success and wealth to be among the predominant individual goals of
American society – the American way of life. Yet alongside these “cultural goals”, the
cultural structure also contains the paths – termed “institutional norms” – by which
these goals can be attained. The social structure, by contrast, describes the actually ex-
isting ways of legally attaining the predetermined goals.
If there is little access to conventional and legitimate means for becoming successful,
deviant forms of behaviour become increasingly common. This undermining of the ex-
tant norms ultimately leads to the collapse of the cultural structure, that is, to anomie
(ibid. p. 198f.). Because of the absence of realistic opportunities for advancement in the
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lower strata of society, deviant behaviour is particularly common amongst this class, as
evidenced by statistics on criminality (ibid. p. 198).
The differences between Durkheim's concept of anomie and Merton’s approach are
readily evident: whereas Durkheim based his approach on the threat of rulelessness re-
sulting from a lack of social cohesion, Merton emphasises the inequality of the opportu-
nities to attain legitimate goals by legal means. According to Durkheim, the societies
most at risk of anomie are those in which the pace of differentiation exceeds that of so-
cial integration; for Merton the social groups most endangered by anomie are those that
simply lack the adequate means to attain the aims set for them by society.
In recent years a more subject-centred conception of anomie has once again been pro-
pounded. Rousseau’s view that modern society deforms individuals, makes them unfree,
dependent and unhappy has enjoyed a renaissance at the threshold to the twenty-first
century. With his study The Corrosion of Character, which deals with the psycho-social
consequences of the new, global capitalism, Richard Sennett has published one of the
best-researched analyses in this area (Sennett 1998).
According to Sennett, this new economic system is geared wholly towards flexibility
and the short run, in accordance with the motto “No long term”. Sennett offers a large
number of empirical observations in support of his hypothesis that time has been re-
structured. He points to the cult of re-engineering, to the increasing number of perma-
nent jobs converted into fixed-term projects and flexible work areas, and to the ex-
panding market for temporary employment (ibid. pp. 46-63).
What Sennett considers more important than describing the culture of the new capital-
ism, however, are the consequences for individuals of the increasingly short-term ori-
entation of working life. He asks (ibid. p. 26): How can individuals continue to pursue
long-term aims? How can they develop lasting social relationships? How can identities
be created? Are reliability, single-mindedness and loyalty still characteristics that are
required by today’s world? Human needs for continuity, security, meaning, identity and
social integration are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the flexibility of the new
capitalism. “The conditions of time in the new capitalism have created a conflict be-
tween character and experience” (ibid. p. 31). Sennett believes that enforced flexibility
and mobility, that is, the drift from one job to the next and from one place to another,
leads to alienation, feelings of meaninglessness and social isolation.
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In very different ways, Durkheim, Merton and Sennett have drawn attention in their
studies to the negative sides of progress: Durkheim to the creeping dissolution of soci-
ety and the rulelessness associated with this process; Merton to the discrepancy between
cultural goals and the legal means to attain them, which leads to deviant behaviour; and
Sennett to the erosion of human character in a global capitalism based on flexibility.
What unites these authors, however, are their misgivings that modernisation processes
make people more lonely, insecure and unhappy.
II Catch-up modernisation in Germany
“We Germans do not have ourselves to thank for the fact
that, at the end of this century, we are after all united in
the world of civil rights, institutionalised conflicts, guar-
anteed freedom and legal security.”
M. Rainer Lepsius (1995, p. 30)
German history during the last fifty years is a history of catch-up modernisation (nach-
holende Modernisierung), and both the direction and the dynamic of social development
have been determined to a considerable degree by exogenous impulses.
In western Germany, it was under the auspices of the western occupying powers that the
first steps were taken towards establishing the social market economy and representa-
tive democracy. On the basis of these institutions and the support provided under the
USA’s European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), developments occurred that were
successful in both economic and political terms (Benz 1989). In retrospect the 1950s
and 1960s appear as a golden age: incomes and living standards rose substantially,
while at the same time working time was reduced and working conditions improved.
The welfare state was extended, improving protection against the financial implications
of unemployment, sickness, disability and old age. Freedom, wealth and security were
experienced by virtually all strata of the population – albeit to varying extents. Yet it
would be to distort reality to claim that these changes occurred without conflict: wage
increases and cuts in working hours, for instance, were only achieved against bitter op-
position.
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At the end of the 1960s the intensity of social conflict increased substantially, sparked
off by international protests against the Vietnam War. The student-led anti-authoritarian
protest movement initially demanded democratic reforms in the universities, and later
radical changes in social structures. Although the New Left failed in its aim to abolish
all existing structures of power and authority, the student protests changed the face of
society, accelerating the processes of democratisation and liberalisation, which had be-
come bogged down in the preceding years.
In the mid-1970s exogenous shocks once again led to social upheavals. The oil-price
shock led to a serious recession, in the course of which unemployment rose sharply. Just
a few years later a second severe economic crisis led to a further rise in unemployment.
The social security systems that had been expanded in times of full employment had to
be stabilised with the help of government grants, which in turn led to a doubling of gov-
ernment debt as a proportion of GDP, from 20 to 40 percent within a decade. At the
same time, the environmental damage produced by the unabated economic growth be-
came increasingly evident.
The question of how to interpret the political, economic and social turbulence of the
1970s and 1980s remains a controversial one (see the contributions to Berger 1986).
Proponents of theories focusing on innovation and modernisation, such as Walter L.
Bühl and Wolfgang Zapf, have interpreted them as problems of a transition from one
“Kondratieff cycle” to the next (Bühl 1986; Zapf 1986). In order to accelerate this proc-
ess they recommended innovation-promoting measures, encompassing a broad spectrum
of deregulation and active innovation policies (Zapf 1986, p. 173). These authors con-
sidered further-reaching economic and social reforms to be superfluous. “Competitive
democracy, a market economy and a prosperous society with a welfare state and mass
consumption are the fundamental institutions within which struggles for innovation take
place” (Zapf 1991, p. 46). The future of western industrialised societies was interpreted
as a process of “ongoing modernisation”, ongoing “in the double sense of consistency
of direction and structural improvement” (ibid.).
Yet, as Zapf himself concedes, there are arguments against the hypothesis of ongoing
modernisation that deserve serious consideration: evidence of the social limitations on
growth; concerns that increasing individualisation and the loss of steering capacity
might erode modern institutions; signs that institutional change is proceeding so dra-
matically that an epoch-making break is imminent; and, finally, doubts as to whether the
programme of ongoing modernisation can cope with the global risks and dangers en-
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tailed (ibid. p. 47). These problems are recognised as challenges that modern societies,
such as Germany, must face. They are not accepted, however, as objections to the thesis
of ongoing modernisation, because, states Zapf, there are currently “no more effective
alternatives”, institutions that can better solve the problems we face than the market
economy, democracy and the welfare state (ibid.).
Proponents of a theory of “reflexive modernisation”, such as Ulrich Beck, Anthony
Giddens and Scott Lash (1996), on the other hand, interpret the prevailing economic,
social and ecological problems as symptoms of a systemic crisis. They argue that mod-
ern industrial societies, by virtue of their very success, have undermined their own natu-
ral and social foundations. They derive from this interpretation the necessity of a “re-
flexive modernisation”, the “application of modernisation to itself” (Beck & Bonß 1984,
p. 385). What is required is a “reflexive modernity” which, according to Beck, is both a
“project and a product of modernity” and at the same time is an alternative to it in the
sense of a “counter-modernity” (Beck 1996, p. 59). Yet this “project of a counter-
modernity” has remained very vague to date. Concrete ideas on the institutional design
of a reflexive modernity have yet to be developed.
In eastern Germany the path taken by social development was less successful. Immedi-
ately after the end of the war, the Soviet military administration initiated a process that
was to restructure the economy and society on socialist lines (Weber 1999). Following
the Soviet example, a centrally planned economy and a one-party system were estab-
lished, which subsequently provided the institutional basis for this anti-capitalist mod-
ernity (Brie 1992). Although significant progress was made in industrialising the coun-
try in the early years, this did not lead to the fundamental improvement in living condi-
tions desired by the population. Comparison with the more successful western half of
the country led to dissatisfaction, and between 1949 and 1961 around three million peo-
ple left the country, more or less voluntarily.
Following the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 the socialist regime consolidated its
position relatively successfully. However, ongoing attempts to reform the highly cen-
tralised economic system had to be suspended under instruction from the Soviet leader-
ship, as did the cautious liberalisation of society. During the 1970s the party and state
leadership undertook new efforts to stabilise their power: internally by pursuing a strat-
egy of so-called “unity of economic and social policy”; externally by seeking to im-
prove the relationship with West Germany.
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Initially both strategies appeared successful. In the 1980s, however, their effects proved
destructive to an extent that was inconceivable previously. The costly social policy ac-
celerated economic decline and brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Moreo-
ver, in its efforts to improve relations with the Federal Republic, the leadership of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) had signed the Helsinki Final Communiqué and
thus committed itself to respecting human and civil rights. Thousands of GDR citizens
subsequently used this commitment to justify their demands for the basic right to travel
and to express their opinions freely. Popular optimism concerning liberalisation in-
creased when wide-ranging reforms were implemented in the Soviet Union. The civil
rights groups intensified their activities, and the number of people attempting to leave
the country rose. At the end of the 1980s mass protest and mass exit attained a dynamic
that finally led to the collapse of the communist regime (Hirschman 1992).
Jürgen Habermas was one of the first to interpret the upheaval throughout eastern
Europe as a “catch-up revolution” (nachholende Revolution), that is, as a revolution that
“frees the path to catch up on missed developments” (Habermas 1990, p. 180). This
prophecy was to prove particularly apposite in the case of eastern Germany. In the first
free parliamentary elections in the GDR, held in March 1990, a majority of the popula-
tion voted for the “Alliance for Germany”, and thus for a swift unification of the two
German states. The coming into force of the Treaty on Economic, Monetary and Social
Union and of the Unification Treaty marked the start of a process of “catch-up moderni-
sation” in eastern Germany. The aim of this transition process was clearly defined: it
was to “import, establish and incorporate modern democratic, market-economic and le-
gal-constitutional institutions” (Zapf 1994, p. 301).
Because the West German set of institutions was assumed completely and unchanged as
a “ready-made state” (Rose et al. 1993), transition occurred at a hugely accelerated
pace. This “modernisation at time-lapse speed” (Geißler 1992) led to a series of eco-
nomic distortions, incurring substantial social costs. Within months unemployment rose
from just a few thousand to over one million; by 1993 more than a third of all jobs had
been lost; the birth rate fell dramatically; and once again thousands of eastern Germans
left the country.
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III Subjective well-being and anomic tendencies in Germany
“Since progress has become self-propelling, future opti-
mism has turned into procedural melancholy.”
Peter Sloterdijk (1988, p. 263)
In the late 1990s Bohle, Heitmeyer, Kühnel and Sander (Bohle et al. 1997) presented an
ambitious concept for the analysis of anomic tendencies in modern societies like Ger-
many. In the view of these authors, modernisation processes in individual parts of soci-
ety take the form of “rapid, undirected, non-simultaneous and contradictory develop-
ments” (ibid., p. 59). These developments lead to “tensions” in different areas of soci-
ety, which intensify and become crises. Bohle et al. distinguish between three types of
crisis in modern society: the “structural crisis”, the “regulation crisis” and the “cohesion
crisis” (ibid.). Structural crises are characterised by breakdowns in social structure, in
particular by growing social inequality, by the exclusion of segments of the population
and by “poverty in conditions of prosperity” (Bohle et al. 1997, p. 59). Regulation cri-
ses, by contrast, are evidenced by “non-conformity of aspirations and factual circum-
stances” and “weakened effectiveness of norms” (ibid.). Cohesion crises are manifested
by the “disintegration or weakening of bonds” (ibid.).
The authors’ intention to unite Merton’s (presented here as a structural or regulation cri-
sis) and Durkheim’s (cohesion crisis) concepts of anomie in their approach is already
apparent at this point. This intention becomes even clearer when Bohle et al. establish a
link between modernisation processes in parts of society and individuals’ ways of proc-
essing them at the levels of attitude and action. Structural crises, they believe, lead to
“innovation, ritualisation, withdrawal, protest and criminality” (ibid., p. 59) – behaviour
patterns that largely correspond to Merton’s typology (Merton 1964, p. 194). Regulation
crises, claim the authors, cause “loss of orientation, loss of plausibility and uncertainty”
(Bohle et al. 1997, p. 59). Cohesion crises, in concordance with Durkheim’s view, are
seen to lead to “alienation, identity problems, isolation and suicide” (ibid.).
Bohle et al. believe that the crises of modernity do not have a direct effect on individual
behaviour, rather that strengthening or weakening occur at the intermediary level. On
this view, symptoms of anomie do not, therefore, spread simultaneously through all
spheres of society, nor do they manifest themselves only in one way (ibid., p. 62). Nev-
ertheless, Heitmeyer sees much evidence for the view that anomie is “not a transitory
THOMAS BULMAHN
11
phenomenon that recurs episodically”, rather is a “structural feature of modern socie-
ties” (Heitmeyer 1997, p. 16). He believes that this applies in particular to Germany, be-
cause “reunification, the collapse of the political system in the East, the globalisation of
capital and communication, mass unemployment, and cultural, religious and ethnic con-
flicts […] have led to a profound uncertainty and helplessness, which permeates all ar-
eas of society and whose destructive consequences at both the individual and collective
level have to date neither been adequately recognised nor discussed” (ibid., p. 10).
Among the indicators that can expose these “destructive consequences”, he lists feelings
of meaninglessness and powerlessness, apathy and suicidal tendencies (ibid., p. 16). The
cautious misgivings of Durkheim, Merton and Sennett that modernisation processes
could make people more lonely, insecure and unhappy have given way in Heitmeyer to
a questionable certainty.
The following discussion will seek to determine the extent of anomic tendencies in
Germany on the basis of the above and a range of other indicators. At the heart of the
discussion are four questions: Are dissatisfaction and anxiety really growing? Are the
Germans truly becoming increasingly unhappy? To what extent is there an increase in
the frequency of anomic reactions such as powerlessness, loneliness, meaninglessness,
disorientation and pessimism? Has the propensity to commit suicide increased or de-
creased?
The analyses are based on data from the German Welfare Survey (Wohlfahrtssurvey)
and from the official statistics of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Welfare Survey
is a social science population survey of objective living conditions and subjective well-
being (Glatzer & Zapf 1984; Habich & Noll 1999). The first Welfare Survey was car-
ried out in West Germany in 1978. Additional polls followed in 1980, 1984 and 1988.
The respondents had German citizenship and were at least 18 years of age. Data were
first collected in eastern Germany in 1990. The first Welfare Survey of unified Germany
took place in 1993, the second in 1998. During the latter survey, 2,007 persons were
questioned in the former West Germany and 1,035 persons in the former GDR.
Life satisfaction, which is based on a range of comparisons and weightings, is consid-
ered to represent a broad assessment of personal living conditions. Current living con-
ditions are compared with those desired, with those of the past and with those aspired to
in the future for oneself or relevant reference persons. In addition to individual levels of
aspiration, the significance given to different areas of life is also important. Thus, life
MODERNITY AND HAPPINESS
12
satisfaction is the total of a cognitive sum of all factors. The Welfare Survey measures
life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).
Table 1: Life Satisfaction of German citizens in the West and in the East
Dissat-
isfied
Life Satisfaction1 Com-
pletely
satisfied
Mean
0 - 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
in %
West Germany
1978 4 6 7 15 32 18 18 7,8
1980 4 8 8 18 30 13 18 7,7
1084 6 7 6 14 32 17 17 7,7
1988 3 5 7 15 34 19 17 7,9
1993 3 5 7 16 33 22 14 7,9
1998 4 5 8 18 35 19 12 7,7
East Germany
1990 11 17 14 21 24 8 6 6,6
1993 9 12 13 24 27 9 6 6,9
1998 6 9 11 22 35 11 8 7,3
1
 Question: „What do you mean, how satisfied are you at present with your life in general?“ 
Measured on a scale from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).
Database: Welfare Survey 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990-East, 1993, 1998.
The large majority of the population of western Germany ranked itself in the top half of
the scale in 1998 (see Table 1). A large share of people are very satisfied with their own
life, while around every tenth person is completely satisfied (Level 10). Only a small
minority is dissatisfied (Levels 0-4). A comparison with the results from 1978 shows
that satisfaction with life in western Germany has consolidated. The high levels of satis-
faction recorded as early as the late 1970s have hardly varied since. The share of those
who are completely satisfied with their lives (Level 10) has declined the most.
Conspicuous variations have occurred in the eastern German data in recent years. The
distribution of satisfied respondents has become very similar to the pattern for western
Germany, without yet being fully identical. The share of those who are satisfied with
their lives has increased, mirrored by a decline in the share of those who are more dis-
satisfied. There are still differences at the highest levels: the share of those who are
completely satisfied is still smaller than in the west. The mean for satisfaction has risen
from 6.6 to 7.3, and the distance to the western level of satisfaction has fallen from 1.3
points to 0.4 points over the same period.
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The sense of happiness is another indicator used to describe subjective well-being.
While life satisfaction is considered to be primarily an expression of cognitive well-
being, happiness is more a indication of emotional welfare.
Table 2: Happiness of German citizens in the West and in the East
Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days -
would you say you are...
Very unhappy Not too happy Pretty happy Very happy
in %
West Germany
1978 1 4 74 22
1980 1 5 69 26
1984 1 8 72 20
1988 1 4 72 23
1993 1 5 70 24
1998 1 8 72 20
East Germany
1990 1 14 74 10
1993 1 12 75 12
1998 1 11 72 16
Database: Welfare Survey 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990-East, 1993, 1998.
As in the case of life satisfaction, the sense of happiness amongst western Germans has
also changed only insignificantly in recent years (see Table 2). The share of those who
considered themselves to be very happy has amounted to between 20 and 26 percent in
all the surveys carried out since 1978, and the majority of the western German popula-
tion has responded that they are currently more happy than unhappy. Only a minority
responded that they were currently leading an unhappy life.
In eastern Germany the population is now not only more satisfied with life, but also
happier. In 1990, 10 percent of eastern Germans responded that their life was currently
“very happy”, and this share had risen to no less than 16 percent in 1998. The distance
to the western German level for sense of happiness also decreased, and the distribution
patterns have become more similar.
The findings presented so far portray a largely satisfied and happy population. Interna-
tional comparisons show that the level of subjective well-being found in Germany is not
unusually high, rather that it represents the average (Veenhoven 1992; Cummins 1998;
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Diener & Suh 1999). It appears that in most western societies “most people are happy”
(Diener & Diener 1996).
Table 3: Agreement of German citizens in the West and in the East to items of anxiety1
Do you of-
ten get
spells of
exhaustion
or fatigue?
Do fright-
ening
thoughts
again and
again come
back in your
mind?
Are you
constantly
keyed up
and jittery?
Do you usu-
ally feel
unhappy or
depressed?
Do you of-
ten
shake or
tremble?
None of the
symtoms of
anxiety2
in %
West Germany
1978 54 19 16 14 9 41
1984 47 21 16 15 8 44
1988 44 19 12 10 6 47
1993 39 17 10 10 6 53
1998 39 20 9 12 4 54
East Germany
1990 50 27 18 17 7 37
1993 43 26 14 16 6 44
1998 45 25 12 15 5 43
1 Share of saying „Yes“ in percent.
2 Share of saying „No“ to all five items of anxiety in percent.
Database: Welfare Survey 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990-East, 1993, 1998.
The analysis of symptoms of anxiety and anomie in general leads to the same conclu-
sion, although it is apparent that people’s lives are not entirely free of fears and worries.
Around half of the German population complains of mental strain, and many – 39 per-
cent of westerners and 45 percent of easterners – often feel exhausted (see Table 3). One
fifth of the westerners and a quarter of the easterners have fears and worries.
Only a few respondents, however, report permanent difficulties: only every tenth person
is constantly agitated and nervous or usually feels unhappy or despondent. The extent of
mental strain has decreased steadily over the last 20 years. The number of western Ger-
mans reporting states of exhaustion, agitation or nervousness is in constant decline. In
1998, 54 percent of the respondents had none of the above symptoms, against only 41
percent in 1978. The situation has also improved considerably in eastern Germany, and
the share of those who have no symptoms of anxiety has increased significantly.
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A multi-dimensional concept is used to measure anomic reactions in the narrower sense.
The five dimensions were surveyed using the following indicators: powerlessness:
agreement with the statement “I can do little to change most of our current problems”;
social isolation: agreement with the statement “I often feel lonely”; alienation: agree-
ment with the statement: “I don’t really enjoy my job”; disorientation: agreement with
the statement: “Life has become so complicated that I almost can’t cope”; pessimism:
disagreement with the statement “When I think about the future I’m really quite confi-
dent”.
Table 4: Agreement of German citizens in the West and in the East to items of anomie
Dimensions of Anomie
Power-
lessness
Social
Isolation
Alienation Disorientation Pessimism
in %
West Germany
1978 69 17 - - -
1980 - 18 15 15 -
1984 - 17 15 14 -
1988 - 14 14 11 -
1993 74 13 11 13 43
1998 67 16 12 14 33
East Germany
1990 75 22 22 40 -
1993 86 16 17 32 46
1998 76 16 13 21 46
Database: Welfare Survey 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990-East, 1993, 1998.
The data show that the frequency of anomic reactions varies across the different dimen-
sions. The majority of western Germans believes that they can do little to change most
of our current problems. This result is, however, no cause for alarm, given that it ex-
presses a realistic assessment in view of the few personal possibilities to bring about
change in a complex society. A third of the population is inclined to be pessimistic
about the future. Relatively few people complain of social isolation, alienation or dis-
orientation. The comparison over time shows clearly that the frequency of anomic reac-
tions has not increased, rather has remained almost stable at a relatively moderate level.
The extent of alienation and pessimism has in fact decreased. The belief that there is an
increasing anomic corrosion of society must be strongly doubted in the light of these
empirical findings.
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The suitability of the indicators used in the Welfare Survey to measure anomic pres-
sures was proven at the latest by the data from eastern Germany in the early 1990s.
During this period of accelerated modernisation, anomic reactions appeared relatively
frequently among the eastern German respondents. The large majority of the population
felt helplessly at the mercy of the social upheavals and the resulting difficulties. Many
suffered from disorientation: four out of ten citizens agreed that circumstances had be-
come so complicated that they were unable to cope. The pace of catch-up modernisation
has now eased, and the level of anomie has approached the value for western Germany.
Figure 1: Suicidal Mortality in West Germany and East Germany 1968-1998
 Suicidal Mortality1
                   East Germany
      West Germany
1 Standardized Mortality Rate (SMR): Number of suicides (E950-E959) per 100.000 inhabitants.
Database: Bergmann et al. 1993; Official Statistics of Germany.
Suicidal mortality is a classical instrument for measuring anomie. Unlike the indicators
of subjective well-being examined so far, this is an objective gauge in the broadest
sense. Suicides are registered on the basis of the “International Statistical Classification
of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death” (ICD). The ICD was introduced to both parts
of Germany only in 1968, and the data on suicidality can only be compared unreserv-
edly from that year on (Bergmann et al. 1993, p. 8).
As the data show, there was a slight increase in suicidal mortality in West Germany in
the early 1970s. The economic and social upheavals described above probably contrib-
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uted to this trend, even if they were not the only factor. The trend was reversed, how-
ever, in the late 1970s, and the suicide rate declined slightly. At the end of the 1980s
there was a notable decline in suicides, and in the mid-1990s a historic low of less than
15 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants was reached.
The trend was considerably more dramatic in eastern Germany, where there was a sharp
rise in the suicide rate until the early 1970s. This trend can at least partly be traced back
to the hermetic sealing of the country’s borders and the re-intensification of state repres-
sion in the 1960s (Belau 1991; Müller 1992, pp. 1312-1314). In those years it was nei-
ther possible to demand social change nor could the people leave the country. The
situation improved somewhat when the communist regime began to permit a few tens of
thousands of citizens a year to leave for West Germany and when fundamental reforms
were introduced in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Both developments allowed hopes to
rise, amongst some for a more liberal society and amongst others that they would be
able to leave the GDR. These hopes may have contributed to the decline in suicidal
mortality – possibly more so than the improvement in living conditions attained through
the social policy reforms. At 29 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the suicide rate in
1988 was at the same level as in the late 1960s. The rate only fell below this level fol-
lowing the demise of the communist regime, a trend which was briefly interrupted only
in 1991.
The analyses show that there is absolutely no evidence of increased anomie in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany – at least at the levels of attitude and action observed here.
Happiness and satisfaction amongst the western German population have not decreased
over the last 20 years, rather have remained stable at high levels. The level of anomie
has also remained unchanged. Symptoms of stress and anxiety are observed less fre-
quently and suicidal mortality has declined.
Despite a process of rapid modernisation in eastern Germany, the subjective well-being
of the people has improved considerably: the eastern Germans are more satisfied today
than in 1990, and the share of those who say they are leading a happy life has increased.
Symptoms of anomie, mental strain and propensity to commit suicide have declined
substantially. The example of eastern Germany has shown clearly that even highly ac-
celerated modernisation does not perforce lead to a permanent increase in anomic reac-
tions.
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Modernisation processes are not, therefore, inevitably accompanied by a diffusion of
anomic reactions at the levels of perception and action. The thesis of the “destructive
consequences of social transformation at both the individual and collective level”
(Heitmeyer 1997, p. 10) must be rejected, at least for German society in general.
IV The ambivalence of modernity
There is general agreement that the catch-up modernisation in eastern Germany led to
substantial structural fissures, to higher unemployment and increased social inequality,
to a weakening of existing bonds, and to tensions between the lifeworld that had
evolved and the system world that was transferred. There is no doubt that developments
that can be interpreted as a “structural crisis”, “regulation crisis” or “cohesion crisis”
(Bohle et al. 1997, p. 59) occurred in parts of eastern German society.
Nonetheless, the eastern Germans are more satisfied and happy today than ten years
ago, emerging symptoms of anomie and anxiety decreased again surprisingly quickly
and suicidal mortality has declined to a remarkable extent. All these developments can
be traced back primarily to the successes of the catch-up modernisation: to the enor-
mous improvement in material living conditions, to the concession of civil and human
rights, and to the liberation of the people from the dominance of the state and from en-
forced socialisation.
In an age of “self-propelling progress” and general “procedural melancholy” (Sloter-
dijk) many theorists seem to have lost sight of the positive consequences of modernisa-
tion processes. Yet theories that only see modernisation as a trigger of social crises will
inevitably overlook reality. The models of anomie that are blind to social progress must
be corrected, and the point of departure must be the understanding that modernisation is
an ambivalent process that leads to disintegration and exclusion, but at the same time
also yields new mechanisms of social integration and inclusion. In Durkheim and
Weber’s day, talking about the ambivalence of modernity meant demonstrating its
darker sides; today we must remind ourselves of its successes.
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Figure 2: Modernisation and Subjective Well-Being
SUCCESSES MODERNISATION CRISES
OF MODERNITY OF MODERNITY
Inclusion and integration Technological Change Exclusion caused by
on the basis of a unemployment (EU) 
higher prosperity Disintegration caused by
social inequality (US)
Inclusion as a result Democratisation  Exclusion because of the
of the development system-immanent limits of
of citizenship political participation
Integration due to Individualisation Disintegration caused by
expanding options  weakening or dissolution
and autonomy of social bonds
Potentials to limit the social
consequences of exclusion and disintegration
 (welfare state, social commitment, personal provision)
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
ANOMIA
Psycho-social and socio-cultural
factors (expectations, need-structures)
The modernisation of a national economy does not only lead to higher unemployment –
a problem which particularly affects the European countries (see Figure 2). And it is not
only accompanied by more social inequality and increasing demands for flexibility –
problems which are characteristic for the United States. Technological change is also
usually linked to considerable improvements in performance, which result in a higher
national product. The fact that increased prosperity in the western industrialised coun-
tries has been able to yield a general improvement in living conditions can be traced
back primarily to the success of another modernisation process – the development of
citizenship.
Thomas H. Marshall described the development of citizenship as a process that involved
the establishment of civil rights, then political rights and, finally, social rights (Marshall
1965 [1949]). Each of these rights is linked to specific achievements and institutions,
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which include equality before the law, freedom of opinion, the principle of free elec-
tions and secret ballots, and the institutionalisation of social security. When limits on
personal freedom are discussed today, when the unfair distribution of wealth is la-
mented, or when tendencies towards weaker bonds of solidarity are pointed out, these
complaints – given the existing shortcomings – are justified, indeed necessary. How-
ever, society’s achievements are often disregarded in an unacceptable manner.
A third aspect of modernisation, individualisation, is also dealt with in a relatively one-
sided way. Usually only the disintegration of social bonds, leading to less solidarity and
more social isolation, is mentioned. However, these discussions overlook the fact that
the dissolution of bonds also means liberation – liberation from traditional social and
cultural restraints. Individualisation also always signifies expansion of the horizon of
possibilities, growing autonomy with respect to the way we plan our lives and develop-
ment of a positive self-consciousness.
The ambivalence of modernity, that is, the simultaneity of successes and crises, works
in a complex way on subjective well-being and the level of anomie. Firstly, it can be as-
sumed that the positive and negative effects overlap, resulting in a partial compensation.
In addition, wealth, citizenship and autonomy are themselves effective potentials to
limit the social consequences of exclusion and disintegration. The modern welfare state,
social commitment and personal provisions represent typical constellations of these
three potentials.
The link between modernisation and well-being becomes even more complex when
psycho-social and socio-cultural factors are taken into consideration: for instance, views
on what constitutes a good life, ideas about an adequate standard of living and beliefs
concerning the rights, freedoms and securities that should be given in a society. These
ideas change – albeit relatively slowly – in the course of modernisation. To cite one ex-
ample, when material living conditions improve, pretensions also increase, expectations
grow and, on the basis of a secure standard of living, new ideas emerge about what is
important in life and what is not. The consequences are well known: after a specific
saturation point has been reached, higher incomes, greater freedom and increased con-
sumption no longer yield satisfaction or happiness. Increasing pretensions and changing
needs neutralise every further purely quantitative improvement in the standard of living.
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V Temporal and structural imbalances
The effects of modernisation processes on subjective well-being and on the level of
anomie essentially depend on three factors: firstly, on the degree to which new mecha-
nisms of integration and inclusion can counterbalance disintegration and exclusion; sec-
ondly, on the existence of effective potentials that contribute to social equality and so-
cial security; and, thirdly, on the pace of social transformation.
An increase in disintegration and exclusion is the rule during periods of rapid moderni-
sation. When, as in the case of eastern Germany, there are simultaneous gains in wealth,
extended citizenship and a broadening of options and autonomy, then some of the mani-
festations of crisis are counterbalanced. If social security systems that cushion the trials
of social upheaval also exist, then the sum effect is positive. Because levels of preten-
sion and need structures change more slowly than living conditions, happiness and satis-
faction increase and symptoms of anomie and anxiety appear ever less frequently.
If, as in most of the post-communist transition countries, the successes of modernisation
do not materialise, and if there are no effective mechanisms to combat the social conse-
quences of disintegration and exclusion, then there is an increase in anomic reactions
and the levels of happiness and satisfaction decline (Seifert & Rose 1994; Pickel &
Pickel 1996). The population can become so dissatisfied that strong feed-back effects
ensue for the process of modernisation. In parliamentary elections in Poland (September
1993) and in Russia (December 1993) the post-communist parties benefited from the
widespread disappointment about the economic and social costs of the transition to a
market economy and won large majorities (Meyer 1997). They used their regained
power first and foremost to slow down the pace of social reforms. It is still uncertain
whether these feed-back effects have helped to stabilise the transformation process in
the long term (Juchler 1997, p. 912) or whether the desired improvement in living con-
ditions will fail to arrive and further frustration and instability will follow.
When, as in western Germany, modernisation proceeds at a moderate pace, then there
are usually only marginal variations in subjective well-being and the level of anomie.
The positive and negative consequences of modernisation overlap, and the net effect is
at least partly neutralised by self-adjusting levels of pretension and changing need
structures. Subjective well-being or the level of anomie are in a dynamic equilibrium
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whose stability depends particularly on individual and societal potentials to bridge cri-
ses.
However, substantial structural imbalances can be hidden behind a facade of stable
well-being. In some segments of the population there are regular increases in anomic re-
actions, dissatisfaction and unhappiness. The reason is the simple fact that the successes
and crises brought about by modernisation are distributed unequally.
Thus, for example, the consequences of individualisation can vary considerably de-
pending on age. While younger people benefit especially from increasing autonomy and
from new freedoms, the elderly are distressed by the weakening or dissolution of social
bonds. The consequences of technological change are just as unequally distributed.
While the majority of highly qualified employees can share in the positive effects, par-
ticularly in the form of wage increases and better working conditions, the low skilled
are excluded – either through increasingly frequent unemployment, as in western
Europe, or through banishment to an expanding low-wage sector, as in the USA.
More in-depth studies illustrate the extent to which these structural imbalances can lead
to anomie and dissatisfaction (Glatzer & Bös 1998). As a first example, it has already
been mentioned above that suicidal mortality has declined in western Germany since the
early 1980s. However, this trend does not apply equally to all age groups. Compared to
the general trend, suicidality has increased amongst the elderly (Wiesner et al. 1992). As
a second example, the life satisfaction of the total western German population has var-
ied only insignificantly over the last 20 years. However, a comparison of the trends for
individual income groups reveals significant differences. While the life satisfaction of
higher earners has remained stable at an above-average level, the subjective well-being
of low earners has frequently fluctuated around a comparatively low level.
Summary
Towards the close of the nineteenth century it was commonly asked whether individuals
could live happily in modern society. After a century of many catastrophes these doubts
have given way to general pessimism. The question asked today is just how unhappy
modernity makes the individual. Modernisation is equated with exclusion and disinte-
gration, while anomie, unhappiness and dissatisfaction are considered structural features
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of modern societies. However, these theses do not represent the reality. The link be-
tween modernisation and subjective well-being is more complex and dynamic than is
often assumed today.
In the first place, modernity and happiness are not mutually exclusive. The widely
feared increase in anomic patterns of perception and behaviour has not materialised over
the last 20 years in the Federal Republic of Germany. The happiness and satisfaction of
the people have remained at a high level, and the suicidal mortality rate has fallen
sharply. Increased happiness and satisfaction can even ensue, as in eastern Germany,
during the course of extremely rapid modernisation processes.
Secondly, modernisation is an ambivalent process. The social upheavals in eastern
Germany have made it clear that modernisation not only leads to exclusion and disinte-
gration, but that it is also accompanied – provided it is successful – by the creation of
new mechanisms of inclusion and integration. Increased wealth, development of citizen-
ship, expansion of opportunities and autonomy are some of the aspects of successful
modernisation.
Thirdly, the successes and crises of modernity have complex effects on subjective well-
being. The level and stability of subjective well-being depend substantially on the pos-
sibilities for limiting the social consequences of exclusion and disintegration. Wealth,
citizenship and autonomy are essential requirements for the development of such possi-
bilities, whatever their constellation – whether in the form of a welfare state, social
commitment or personal provision.
Fourthly, structural imbalances are indications of the need to further develop the exist-
ing institutions and mechanisms of social equality. The consequences of exclusion and
disintegration cannot be eliminated by the welfare state, by social commitment or by
private provision; they can only be limited. Financial means cannot substitute participa-
tion in society – at best they can facilitate it. The evolution of the link between moderni-
sation and well-being depends not least on the extent to which more effective mecha-
nisms of social participation and integration are developed in the future.
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